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1   Introduction 
There is strong evidence that computer simulation is increasingly recognized as an 
important analytical tool in many social sciences disciplines and fields. During the last 
ten years, a number of new journals, which are devoted to this field, have been founded 
and others have increased their influence (i.e., JASSS, CMOT, Social Science Com-
puter Review, Autonomous Agent and Multi-Agent Systems, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, Computational Economics, Computational Management Sci-
ence). Special issues and extensive reviews of the literature have been published in 
influential and standard journals1. At the same time, new international associations and 
societies were born, with an increasing number of members (i.e., ESSA in Europe, 
NAACSOS in North America, The Society for Computational Economics), many 
research centers and institutes have been successfully launched2, many workshops, 
conferences and congresses are organized every year (with the first world congress on 
social simulation held in 2006 in Tokyo and the second one in Washington in 2008), 
and an open market of tools and simulation platforms (i.e., Swarm, Repast, Ascape, 
NetLogo), based on a vast community of developers and users, is steadily growing. 
                                                          
1
 Special issues in «American Behavioral Science» in 1999, «Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control» 2001 and 2004, «Computational Economics» 2001 and 2007, «Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences» 2002, «Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization» 
2004, «Journal of Public Economic Theory» 2004, «American Journal of Sociology» 2005; 
«Advances on Complex Systems» 2008; reviews and/or papers in «Nature», «Science», 
«Physica A.», «Journal of Theoretical Biology», «American Sociological Review», «Annual 
Review of Sociology», «Philosophy of the Social Sciences», «Artificial Intelligence Review». 
2
 For example: Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico, USA; Center on Social and Economic Dy-
namics, at the Brookings Institution, Washington, USA; Centre for Policy Modeling in Man-
chester, UK; Centre for Research in Social Simulation in Guildford, UK; Laboratory of 
Agent-Based Social Simulation, CNR, Rome, Italy; Center for Social Complexity at George 
Mason University, Virginia, USA; Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organ-
izational Systems at Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, USA; Center for the Study of Complex 
Systems, University of Michigan, USA. 
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In these last years, a significant number of influential papers, handbooks, tutorials 
and books on simulation have been published in many disciplines. For instance, in the 
social sciences, Axelrod (1997) and Nowak and Sigmund (1998; 2005), independent 
of each other, launched a very influential research program on the study of coopera-
tion and reciprocity via computer simulation, with numerous followers not only in the 
social sciences. Epstein (2007) recently suggested a coherent manifesto to what he 
called “generative social science”, where agent-based models are used as the best-
suited modeling instrument to formalize micro-macro models of social and economic 
phenomena. In his influential manifesto of analytical sociology, Hedström (2005) did 
the same, locating agent-based models at the core of his programmatic argument. 
Sawyer (2005) argued the relevance of computer simulation to understanding social 
emergence. From a methodological perspective, de Marchi (2005) suggested a coher-
ent approach to integrate computational methods with statistical and empirical meth-
ods in the social sciences. 
Agent-based computational economics is a well recognized field, especially by 
evolutionary, institutional and applied economists (Saviotti 2003; Pyka and Arhweiler 
2004), with good examples of relevant handbooks, tutorials or methodological books 
on computer simulation and modeling (i.e., Kendrick, Mercado and Amman 2005; 
Tesfatsion and Judd 2006). In geography and urban studies, there is currently an ef-
fective cross-fertilization between computer simulations and other methods and tools, 
like Geographical Information Systems and statistical surveys and data (i.e. Gimblett 
2002; Batty 2005). Computer simulation is used also in anthropology, ecology and in 
environmental studies (Janssen 2002; Volker and Railsback 2005). In organizational 
and management studies (Prietula, Carley and Gasser 1998; Lomi and Larsen 2000), 
as well as in business engineering and industrial processes planning and control (i.e. 
van Elst, Abeker and Dignum 2004), computer simulation is a well-established tool 
and an innovative method. Scholars in the areas of artificial intelligence and robotics 
are using simulation to explore and design intelligent cooperative systems (i.e., Bona-
beau, Dorigo and Theraulaz 1999). A good number of general textbooks, tutorials and 
introductory books on the usage of computational tools and modeling have been re-
cently published, contributing to the promotion of such an approach in the new gen-
eration of scholars (i.e., Suleiman, Troitzsch and Gilbert 2000; Wooldridge 2002; 
Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005; Shiflet and Shiflet 2006; Gilbert 2008). 
This introduction aims to present an overview on epistemological debates on com-
puter simulation in the social sciences. Does computer simulation mean a new scien-
tific paradigm or is it just a tool? What is the difference between simulation modeling 
and traditional analytic models? Does simulation allow for a new relation between 
theory and data? What are the preconditions for a proper use of simulation? These are 
just a few questions on which the community is recently focusing (Frank and 
Troitzsch 2005). 
In this introduction, we argue that simulation constitutes an inspiring new research 
perspective in the social sciences. As we see in the following sections, as well as in 
most chapters of this book, there are sound substantive and methodological reasons 
for this argument. First, the possibility of using the computer as a tool for formalizing 
generative models of social phenomena, with the aim to foster theory building, explo-
ration and testing, allows us to enlarge the space of application of analytical ap-
proaches in the social sciences. Simulation indeed requires formal models of social 
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phenomena, thereby contributing to a rationalistic approach to research. Thus it pro-
vides an alternative to those streams in the social sciences that are dominated by post-
modernism and by all those approaches that deny the possibility of using formalized 
models in the social sciences. Secondly, by deploying computers, simulation offers 
the chance to produce - and test - patterns of knowledge that would hardly be possible 
without this tool. Thirdly, agent-based simulation is a way to cope with complexity 
and to develop rich, differentiated scenarios at the same time, with several positive 
consequences at the level of realism and empirical foundation of models. 
To give a clear picture of this innovation, the second section summarizes a set of 
epistemological and methodological open issues on which the community is carefully 
focusing at the present. The debate is mostly expressed in terms of vivid disputes on 
dichotomies as follows: generative vs. causal explanations via simulation; meanings 
and forms of emergence, with a confrontation of ontological and epistemological 
meanings; theoretical abstraction vs. empirical foundations; theoretical vs. practical 
purposes. As we see, most of these issues have been explicitly addressed by the au-
thors of this book, making possible to undertake some step forward. As a matter of 
fact, computer simulation helps secularize such philosophical debates by bringing 
them away from a mere foundational and philosophical to a more pragmatic and evi-
dence-oriented level. The varied, even contradictory, positions are an indication of 
this burgeoning, innovative field of research. 
In the third section, we propose our assessment of the future of this field of re-
search. In particular, according to the relevant issues of the present, we attempt to 
identify some epistemological, methodological and substantive puzzles which need to 
be solved. It is our firm belief that the solution to these puzzles would improve the 
scientific progress of simulation. Finally, the fourth section offers a description of the 
book chapters, which are all devoted to clarifying relevant epistemological and meth-
odological issues. 
2   Epistemological and Methodological Issues 
Computer simulations, and specifically agent-based models, should be viewed as an 
epistemological innovation, because they permit and promote a generative approach 
to the modeling and the explanation of social phenomena, strengthening an agent-
based paradigm to social science (Epstein and Axtell 1996; Epstein 2007). A “genera-
tive approach” is based on the following constituents: 
1. The target of the model is a macro phenomenon of interest, let us say a given 
statistical empirical regularity, evidence or a stylized fact; 
2. The model comprehends a set of theoretical hypotheses about a population of 
agents, rules, constraints and interaction structures, which the modeler be-
lieves to be a system that maps those generative causal processes that are sup-
posed to be responsible for the phenomenon; 
3. The simulation of the model allows us to produce a set of artificial data, which 
are controlled by means of a set of indicators, and which are also used to ad-
just and verify the initial hypotheses; 
4. These data are then compared to the empirical data, evidence, or to stylized 
facts that are the explanatory target of the modeler. 
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The epistemological assumption is if we are able to generate or grow a macro 
phenomenon via an agent-based model, on the basis of theoretically or empirically 
plausible assumptions on the micro-foundations, then we can consider these assump-
tions as sufficient, even if not necessary conditions for explaining it. Therefore, the 
simulation model is seen as an engine to find candidate explanations of macro social 
phenomena (Epstein 2007). This position is a kind of standard in social simulation. 
2.1   Generative Explanation 
As the readers will see by going through some chapters of this book, the generative 
assumption has been both criticized and developed on two main facets: the difference 
between a generative and a causal explanation and the difference between a “pure” 
theoretical explanation and a multi-level empirically-founded model. 
Regarding the first facet, it is standard practice to assume that a generative 
explanation would differ from a standard covering law, a statistical or a narrative 
explanation because the former would be based on a mechanisms-based explanation 
(Goldthorpe 2000; George and Bennett 2004). In this perspective, explaining a macro 
empirical phenomenon of interest means referring to a set of entities and processes 
(agents, action and interaction) that are spatially and temporally organised in such a 
way that they regularly bring about that phenomenon (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). 
In other words, a social mechanism is “a constellation of entities and activities that are 
linked to one another in such a way that they regularly bring about a particular type of 
outcome” (Hedström 2005, 11). As George and Bennett correctly pointed out (2004, 
141), the difference between a law and a mechanism means a difference between a 
static correlation (“If X, then Y”) and a specification process (“X leads to Y though 
steps A, B, C”) (George and Bennett 2004, 141). 
In order to take such a process into account in the social sciences, it is necessary to 
identify what James Coleman (1990) defined as the chains of macro-micro-macro 
links: macro-micro situation mechanisms, micro-micro interaction mechanisms, and 
micro-macro transformation mechanism. According to the so called “Coleman bath 
tub”, a mechanisms-based explanation should first dissect and then combine the jointed 
action of situational mechanisms (macro-micro), action-formation mechanisms (micro-
micro), and transformational mechanisms (micro-macro). The analogy of the bath tub 
symbolizes that macro outcomes are what can be seen on surface, hopefully expressed 
in formal terms of empirical regularities, such as statistical properties or stylised facts. 
But, to understand why and how the surface moves, researchers should go under the 
surface, to see the causal engine of the movement (Squazzoni 2008). 
It is well known that mechanisms are often brought about by bundles or 
configurations of mechanisms, “some of which contribute to the effect and some of 
which may operate to counteract the effect or reduce its magnitude”. The following is 
a simple example, which has been reported by Paul Humphreys:  
“a car went off a road at a curve because of excessive speed and 
the presence of sand on the road and despite clear visibility and 
an alert driver. He notes that the addition of another mechanism 
or contextual factor can change a contributing cause to a counter-
acting one, or vice-versa: sand decreases traction on a dry road, 
but increases traction when there is ice on the road” (George and 
Bennett 2004, 145-146). 
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If this is true, how is it possible to specify what kind of mechanism is working in the 
phenomenon of interest, and in what direction they are conducting the bath tub? There 
is no space to get into more detail on this point, but the argument we would like to 
emphasize here is as follows: a) the possibility to use an agent-based model to generate 
a phenomenon does not automatically mean to be in a position to have a causal expla-
nation; b) given the famous arguments of the so-called “multiple realizability” (George 
and Bennett 2004; Sawyer 2005), according to which a mechanisms-based explanation 
closely depends on the capability of combining theoretical assumptions and empirical 
specifications. This is based on the famous arguments of the so-called “multiple re-
alizability” (George and Bennett 2004; Sawyer 2005): the same micro-mechanism 
could produce different macro outcomes, and the same macro outcome could be pro-
duced by different micro mechanisms, Just the reference to empirical evidence can 
help discriminate among potential alternative theoretical explanations. 
2.2   Empirical Foundations and Validation of Simulation Models 
There is growing literature on the quest of the empirical foundations and validation of 
computer simulation models, in particular in the field of agent-based models (i.e., 
Boero and Squazzoni 2005; Windrum, Fagiolo and Moneta 2007). As the reader will 
see, four of the chapters of this book deal exactly with this topic. The question is: is 
the theory behind a model really enough to do good science? 
Social simulation researchers seem implicitly split on this question. One faction 
considers computer simulation as a method for theory building and exploration, as 
though the computer is a complete substitute for laboratory experiments and empirical 
analyses. The other faction denies that computer simulation is a self-exhaustive ex-
perimental tool and believe that the purpose of social science, also that of computa-
tional social science, is primarily to explain empirical phenomena, with the recourse 
to empirical data. 
The first faction believes in the intrinsic added value of the “artificial societies” as a 
means to strengthen the theoretical foundations of social sciences. This faction believes 
that the problem with the development of the social sciences lies in the weakness of the 
theoretical pillars. This faction believes in the “synthetic” features of simulation, i.e. in 
the use of computer simulation to synthesize all the aspects of the complex nature of 
social life. The second faction believes that computer simulation is just a tool that 
allows the social scientist to explain empirical phenomena, a tool that should be used 
with other tools and empirical methods. This faction believes that the problem lies in 
the excess of theoretical accounts and models, and the need for strengthening the ca-
pacity of modeling and understanding specific empirical phenomena. 
This is basically the epistemological side of the debate on the empirical founda-
tions and validation of simulation models. Some chapters of this book explicitly or 
implicitly focus on this side (Chapter 2 by Rosaria Conte, Chapter 4 by Scott Moss 
and Chapter 10 by Paul Ormerod and Bridget Rosewell). Regarding the methodologi-
cal side, a good number of contributions and examples have recently started to eluci-
date part of the complicated implications of available methodological practices (i.e., 
Moss and Edmonds 2005; de Marchi 2005; Windrum, Fagiolo and Moneta 2007). For 
instance, given the micro-macro link that dominates the social phenomena, an inter-
esting methodological issue is the need for a multi-level validation of the model, 
6 U. Frank, F. Squazzoni, and K.G. Troitzsch 
where empirical data on the macro level are combined with empirical data on the 
micro level (Boero and Squazzoni 2005). The challenge is to understand how to foster 
standard methodological practices of validation that could be shared and tested by the 
community. 
2.3   Emergence 
The concept of emergence is tied up with the concept of simulation (Sawyer 2005). 
Two of the chapters in this book try to explicitly deepen such a tie (Chapters 5 and 6 
by Alex Schmid and Martin Neumann). In fact, emergence is closely related to “prop-
erties”, “structures”, “regularities”, “patterns” and “phenomena” that are macro con-
sequences of basic generative processes that can only be explored via simulations 
(Bedau 1997). Therefore, it seems that simulation is a suitable approach to reconstruct 
and explain emergence. 
From an epistemological viewpoint, the debate in social simulation seems to be 
stuck in the middle of two extremes (Squazzoni 2008): the ontological meaning of 
emergence and the micro-reductionism. 
A first faction of social scientists vindicates the reductionistic approach to simula-
tion, refusing any possible ontological meaning of emergence (Hedström 2005; Ep-
stein 2007). The position is extremely coherent: if a theoretical explanation of a 
macro social phenomenon of interest means the creation of a simulation model to 
explore plausible theoretical micro assumptions that generate and explain the phe-
nomenon, then macro patterns, phenomena, or processes under study are the resultant 
implications of micro-assumptions explored inside a formalised model. Particularly, 
counter-intuitive and intriguing macro phenomena, which would be said “to emerge” 
by the supporters of social emergence, can be in principle and de facto reduced to a 
set of mechanisms at the lower level (Kim 2006). In the social sciences, such a posi-
tion totally conforms to the methodological individualism (Coleman 1990), where the 
ontological existence of “invisibles” or “social entities” and their supposed “causal 
power” are ontologically and methodologically rejected (Hedström 2005). It is recog-
nized that social science theory requires the explicit generative reference to individual 
action and interaction to avoid the risk of reifying and evoking macro categorical 
concepts, such as “class”, “culture”, or “system”, which are often used as explanatory 
categories in a tautological way. The division between the micro and the macro levels 
of a model and the analysis of their relation are simply epistemological practices exe-
cuted by the scientist for analytic purposes, and not an ontological feature of the so-
cial reality in itself (Gilbert 2005; Squazzoni 2008). 
On the contrary, a second faction of scientists suggests a kind of radical emergen-
tism (Sawyer 2005). Strongly based on a long tradition in philosophy, as well as on 
classic macro sociology, this faction argues the ontological nature of social emer-
gence. Societal phenomena would belong to a different ontological level of reality 
compared to individual phenomena. This results in social scientists replacing the 
causal determinism of the micro level of the reductionists with the causal determinism 
of the macro level, assigning macro causal power and ontological autonomy to social 
entities. 
In the middle, there is the pragmatic attitude of many social simulation researchers 
who see emergent properties and phenomena simply as epistemological features of 
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the scientific inquiry. This last faction refuses to accept the ontological meaning of 
emergence, the supposed causal power of macro social entities, and even the idea that 
emergence properties are intrinsic features of the reality (Bedau 1997). They instead 
believe that emergence is a concept with an epistemological value in itself and is 
created by the scientist with the aim to identify and refer to macro dynamics and 
change in quantitative and qualitative terms (Gilbert 2002; 2005). Social simulation 
strengthens links and integrative frameworks, and “secularises” this dispute, by bring-
ing it away from a foundational and philosophical level to a more pragmatic one 
(Squazzoni 2008). In any case, as some of the chapters of this book demonstrate 
(Chapter 3 by Rosaria Conte and the three chapters on emergence by Alex Schmid, 
Martin Neumann and Camille Roth), the dispute is still wide open and deserves fur-
ther contributions. 
3   Future Prospects 
The relation between theory, models and empirical validation should be considered as 
the next frontier for the advancement of social simulation. If theoretical abstraction 
should be naturally viewed as an essential part of scientific research, the development 
of computer simulations in the social sciences should be related to their capacity to 
foster the explanation of empirical phenomena. This is to avoid the risk of the self-
referential nature of theoretical models as well. 
If this is true, a challenge for the future is the appropriate combination of computer 
simulation with other methods. Instead of seeing computer simulation as a different 
method, or as an exhaustive method per se, a good practice would be to work towards 
combining different formal, experimental, statistical and empirical methods and try to 
exploit the best of each one (de Marchi 2005). The epistemological consequence 
would be also to expand upon the analysis of the qualities and properties that perhaps 
make computer simulation different from other methods and tools. But the recogni-
tion of these prospective differences does not imply, as thought by many computa-
tional social scientists, that computer simulation models should be necessarily judged 
outside the standard framework and practices of science.  
From a methodological viewpoint, many scholars have already recognized a future 
prospect in the field of verification/ validation/ sharing/ communication of models and 
results (Axelrod 2006; Windrum, Fagiolo and Moneta 2007). As Gintis correctly 
outlined (2007), computer simulation models, in particular agent-based models, are 
profoundly penalized within the standard scientific community because of many prob-
lems of scientific communication and inter-subjective control. The case of economics 
is emblematic. In economics, agent-based models are sometimes introduced as theo-
retical models to be used as an alternative to formal analytical economic theory, 
sometimes as empirical models from which one could infer properties that could be 
analytically systematized, or on which one could build comparisons among particular 
cases. In any case, the lack of transparency and the impossibility/difficulty to enter  
in all the details of a model and of a set of simulations make evaluation of a simula-
tion model often impossible. Only an expert in the computer language used or the 
expert who designed precisely those simulations presented in that paper understand 
the details. The result may be that referees of journals are forced to take the author’s 
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assertions on faith alone. This is where standard analytic models are superior to agent-
based computational ones at the present. Moreover, let us suppose that a model is the 
result of a collaboration between a social scientist and a computer scientist, as often 
happens. In such a case, the problem of the verification is generally underestimated. 
Nuno David correctly emphasizes this in his chapter: there is a risk of underestimating 
possible misunderstandings and hidden differences between the theoretical and the 
implemented model, which are a natural source of theoretical invalidation of simula-
tion results and, as a consequence, of the theoretical inferences conducted on them. 
This observation strongly supports our final claim that the future of social simula-
tion and the appropriate usage of computer simulation in the social sciences will de-
pend on the investment that the leading scholars and institutions in this field will do 
on the training and education of young scholars, PhD and undergraduate students in 
simulation languages. This is necessary for raising a generation of young social scien-
tists able to advance the scientific frontier of social simulation and to embed computer 
simulation in the standard toolkit of the social scientist of the 21st century. What is 
needed is to slowly but surely get out of the current “hand-crafted” phase, to be able 
to enter in a new phase, where standard practices, methods and scientific communica-
tion can get stronger and cumulate step-by-step. 
4   Summary of the Book 
The chapters of this book are very heterogeneous in their contents, but they can all be 
subsumed under the same general purpose. They are good examples of the present 
quest for the pre-conditions, processes and consequences of computer simulation in 
the social sciences, combined with the methodological, epistemological and substan-
tive issues. 
The second chapter, “The Epistemologies of the Social Simulation Research” is an 
invited contribution by Nigel Gilbert and Petra Ahrweiler. The authors aim to fertilize 
the epistemological debate on social simulation with the philosophical debate in the 
social sciences. They conclude with a critical and pragmatic position on the need for 
an epistemological and methodological unified perspective, arguing that evaluation 
criteria for simulation research need to be tuned to research aims, methodological 
positions and domains of study, rather than being conditioned by epistemological 
and/or methodological pre-established viewpoints. 
The third chapter, “From Simulation to Theory (and Backward)” is an invited con-
tribution by Rosaria Conte. It focusses on the “generative approach” to computational 
social sciences, which has been synthesized in the recent “generativist manifesto” by 
Epstein (2007). The author argues against the tendency to conflate theory and simula-
tion, as well as explanation and computational generativeness. She proposes a body of 
arguments to emphasize the relevance of a computational social science theory that 
should be able to combine bottom-up theory of general local rules and top-down 
downward causation. In doing so, she locates herself in the recent debate on the dis-
tinctive features of social emergence (Sawyer 2005). 
The fourth chapter, “Talking about ABSS: Functional Descriptions of Models”, by 
Scott Moss, attempts to integrate empirical and abstracted models, with the aim of re-
ducing the divide between the practices and the approaches of empirical and theoretical 
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analyses in social simulation. The author suggests a framework to foster the discussion 
of epistemological issues, such as prediction, validation and verification. 
The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters constitute a sub-section focused on emer-
gence. Alex Schmid proposes a review of ontological and epistemological meanings 
of emergence, with a contextualization of the particular role of computer simulation 
as an analytical tool for studying emergent properties and processes, while Martin 
Neumann reassesses the literature to propose a conceptual framework for understand-
ing the autonomy of the emergent properties in social spheres. Finally, Camille Roth 
argues that reductionism and emergentism fail at the same time in detecting ill-
conceived modeling ontology. 
The eighth chapter, “Narrative Scenarios, Mediating Formalisms, and the Agent-
Based Simulation of Land Use Change” by Nick Gotts and J. Gary Polhill, inaugurates 
the methodological chapters of this book. The authors move on from the evidence that 
the kinds of systems studied through agent-based models in the social sciences are first 
understood in terms of narrative languages and descriptions, with the consequence that 
a set of problems arise because of the difference between the semantics of natural lan-
guage and programming languages. Using examples taken from simulation of land use 
change, they articulate an ontological framework and a formalism to mediate between 
the two. The following two chapters focus on the relevant quest of the verifica-
tion/validation of simulation models. Nuno David suggests distinguishing between 
verification and validation, as well as clarifying their meanings and their relation. 
Moreover, he tries to embed the methodological debate on the relevant quest of what 
“truth” and what “knowledge” are generated  by means of simulations. Paul Ormerod 
and Bridget Rosewell cope with the quest of the empirical validation of agent-based 
models in the social sciences. They reconstruct some of the difficulties in establishing 
verification and validation of agent-based models, and suggest simplifying the theo-
retical building blocks of the models at most, so that comparison and acceptance of 
models could be improved. Moreover, they bring empirical evidence that supports the 
so called KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principle of agent-based modeling, namely 
that agents in real situations tend to act intuitively rather than rationally. In this per-
spective, they criticize the supposed “naturality” of the cognitive approach to agent-
based models. 
The eleventh chapter, “Abductive Fallacies with Agent-Based Models and System 
Dynamics” by Tobias Lorenz, elaborates on the abductive nature of simulation, with 
particular attention to the role of simulation methodologies in conditioning the model-
ing process. The twelfth chapter, “Algorithmic Analysis of Production Systems Used 
as Agent-Based Social Simulation Models” by Jim Doran, is an exploration of the 
algorithmic analysis of simulation models as a means to systematize model abstrac-
tion. To demonstrate the potential of his exploration, the author refers to an applied 
example, namely the Iruba model of a guerrilla war. Last but not least, the thirteenth 
chapter, “The Nature of Noise”, by Bruce Edmonds, works up a comprehensive ex-
ploration on the concept of noise. The author argues that noise and randomness are 
not the same and thoughtlessly conflating them can result in misleading assumptions. 
This exploration has relevant implication for the modeling and understanding of com-
plex phenomena. 
 
10 U. Frank, F. Squazzoni, and K.G. Troitzsch 
Acknowledgments. This introduction owes much to Alexandra Bohnet (University of 
Koblenz-Landau) who improved grammar and style of the text. 
References 
1. Axelrod, R.: The Complexity of Cooperation. Agent-Based Models of Competition and 
Collaboration. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1997) 
2. Axelrod, R.: Advancing the Art of Simulation in the Social Sciences. In: Rennard, J.P. 
(ed.) Handbook of Research on Nature Inspired Computing for Economy and Manage-
ment. Idea Group, Hersey (2006) 
3. Batty, M.: Cities and Complexity: Understanding Cities with Cellular Automata, Agent-
Based Models, and Fractals. MIT Press, London (2005) 
4. Bedau, M.: Weak Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 11, 375–399 (1997) 
5. Boero, R., Squazzoni, F.: Does Empirical Embeddedness Matter? Methodological Issues 
on Agent-Based Models for Analytical Social Science. Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation 8(4) (2005), http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/6.html 
6. Bonabeau, E., Dorigo, M., Theraulaz, G.: Swarm Intelligence From Natural to Artificial 
Systems. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford (1999) 
7. Coleman, J.: Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
(1990) 
8. de Marchi, S.: Computational and Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge (2005) 
9. Epstein, J.M.: Generative Social Science. Studies in Agent-Based Computational Model-
ing. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2007) 
10. Epstein, J.M., Axtell, R.: Growing Artificial Societies. Social Science from the Bottom-
Up. MIT Press, Cambridge (1996) 
11. Frank, U., Troitzsch, K.G.: Epistemological Perspectives on Simulation. Special Issue, 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 8(4) (2005), http://jasss. 
soc.surrey.ac.uk/8/4/7.html 
12. George, A.L., Bennett, A.: Case-Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
MIT Press, Cambridge (2004) 
13. Gilbert, N.: Varieties of Emergence. In: Sallach, D. (ed.) Social Agents: Ecology, Ex-
change, and Evolution. Agent 2002 Conference, University of Chicago and Argonne Na-
tional Laboratory, pp. 41–56 (2002) 
14. Gilbert, N.: When Does Social Simulation Need Cognitive Models? In: Sun, R. (ed.) Cog-
nition and multi-agent interaction: From cognitive modeling to social simulation. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge (2005) 
15. Gilbert, N., Troitzsch, K.G.: Simulation for the Social Scientists, 2nd edn. Open University 
Press, Buckingham Philadelphia (2005) 
16. Gilbert, N.: Agent-Based Models. Sage Publications, London (2008) 
17. Gimblett, R.H.: Integrating Geographic Information Systems and Agent-based Modeling 
Techniques for Simulating Social and Ecological Processes. Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford (2002) 
18. Gintis, H.: Review of Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume II: Agent-Based 
Computational Economics by Tesfatsion L. and Judd K.J. Journal of Artificial Societies 
and Social Simulation 10(1) (2007), http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/10/1/ 
reviews/gintis.html 
 Epistemological Perspectives on Simulation 11 
19. Goldthorpe, J.H.: On Sociology. Numbers, Narratives and the Integration of Research and 
Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2000) 
20. Hedström, P.: Dissecting the Social. On the Principles of Analytical Sociology. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge (2005) 
21. Hedström, P., Swedberg, R. (eds.): Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social 
Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1998) 
22. Kendrick, D.A., Mercado, P.R., Amman, H.M.: Computational Economics. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton (2005) 
23. Kim, J.: Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues. Synthese 151, 547–559 (2006) 
24. Janssen, M.A. (ed.): Complexity and Ecosystem Management: the Theory and Practice of 
Multi-Agent Systems. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (2002) 
25. Lomi, A., Larsen, E.R. (eds.): Dynamics of Organizations: Computational Modeling and 
Organization Theories. MIT Press, Cambridge (2000) 
26. Moss, S., Edmonds, B.: Sociology and Simulation: Statistical and Qualitative Cross-
Validation. American Journal of Sociology 110(4), 1095–1131 (2005) 
27. Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K.: The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 194, 561–574 (1998) 
28. Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K.: Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity. Nature 437, 1291–1298 
(2005) 
29. Prietula, M., Carley, K., Gasser, L. (eds.): Simulating Organizations: Computational Mod-
els of Institutions and Groups. MIT Press, Cambridge (1998) 
30. Pyka, A., Arhweiler, P.: Applied Evolutionary Economics and Social Simulation. Journal 
of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 7(2) (2004), http://jasss.soc. 
surrey.ac.uk/7/2/6.html 
31. Saviotti, P.P. (ed.): Applied Evolutionary Economics: New Empirical Methods and Simu-
lation Techniques. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (2003) 
32. Sawyer, R.K.: Social Emergence. Societies as Complex Systems. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (2005) 
33. Shiflet, A.B., Shiflet, G.W.: Introduction to Computational Science: Modeling and Simula-
tion for the Sciences. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2006) 
34. Squazzoni, F.: The Micro-Macro Link in Social Simulation. Sociologica, 1, 2 (2008), 
http://www.sociologica.mulino.it/journal/article/index/Artic
le/Journal:ARTICLE:179 
35. Suleiman, R., Troitzsch, K.G., Gilbert, N. (eds.): Tools and Techniques for Social Science 
Simulation. Springer, Heidelberg (2000) 
36. Tesfatsion, L., Judd, K.L. (eds.): Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume II: 
Agent-Based Computational Economics. Elsevier/North-Holland, Amsterdam (2006) 
37. van Elst, L., Dignum, V., Abecker, A. (eds.): AMKM 2003. LNCS, vol. 2926. Springer, 
Heidelberg (2004) 
38. Volker, G., Railsback, S.F.: Individual-Based Modelling and Ecology. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton (2005) 
39. Windrum, P., Fagiolo, G., Moneta, A.: Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models: Al-
ternatives and Prospects. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 8(4) (2007), 
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/10/2/8.html 
40. Wooldridge, M.: An Introduction to Multi-Agent Systems. John Wiley and Sons Limited, 
Chichester (2002) 
